case the criticism is meant to motivate his own counterfactual analysis, and in Vogel's case the criticism promises to be a silver bullet against a theory that has recently found renewed life in the work of Keith DeRose. It will be argued here that the criticism is misguided. My belief that I do not believe falsely that p can track the truth.
The Counterexample to Truth Tracking
Consider the proposition that I do not believe falsely that p. I should be able to know a proposition like that. Sometimes I know p and double-check my sources, thereby coming to know, additionally, that I do not believe falsely that p. Vogel's concern is that this kind of epistemic confidence cannot track the truth: if my belief that I am not mistaken were false, I
would still believe that I'm not mistaken.
Vogel begins by translating the claim of epistemic confidence, "I do not believe falsely that p" as shown. Call it (EC):
(EC) ~(Bp & ~p), Formally, (EC) reads, "it is not the case that both I believe p and p is false." The tracking condition, again, says, if p were false it would not be believed that p: (T) ~p oAE ~Bp.
Knowing (EC) then requires satisfying the following instance of (T): (T*) (Bp & ~p) oAE ~B~(Bp & ~p).
It says this: if I were to believe p falsely, then I would not believe that I do not believe p falsely.
Evaluating this counterfactual is tricky business. Nevertheless, Vogel argues that clearly it is not satisfiable, because he thinks, "If you believe p, you believe that you do not falsely believe p." (2000, 611) Formally,
Of course, if (*) is valid then (T*) is not satisfiable. In the relevantly close worlds where the antecedent of (T*) is true, you believe you are not mistaken. That is because, by (*), in every world where the antecedent of (*) is true, you believe you are not mistaken.
So if (*) is valid and (EC)--i.e., '~(Bp & ~p)'--properly regiments the claim 'I do not believe falsely that p,' then it is not possible to track the truth of this claim. Therefore, if Vogel's logical resources are in order and tracking is a necessary condition on knowledge, then, absurdly, one cannot know that one does not believe falsely that p.
Objections
This is a good place to point out that both the assumption that (*) is valid and the assumption that (EC) best captures the expression of epistemic confidence are questionable. I address each of these worries in turn.
Vogel's criticism of tracking theories depends on the validity of (*). A number of concerns arise. First, it is not obvious that believing p entails having the higher-order belief that one is not mistaken in believing p. That implies that small children and other unreflective thinkers have beliefs about their own beliefs. More to the point, no contradiction flows from the assumption that there is a thinker who, for whatever reason, is able to form only first-order beliefs (i.e., beliefs that do not have the concept of belief as part of their content).
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So we have some reason from the start to be suspicious of (*). There are several problems with this defense, not the least of which is that (CP) is invalid. (CP) notoriously implies that we know even the undiscovered consequences of what we know.
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One might weaken the closure principle by strengthening the antecedent in some way.
To what extent we ought to strengthen the antecedent of (CP) is an open question.
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That we ought to strengthen it, on the other hand, is the received view among those who believe that logical entailment can extend our knowledge. But strengthening the antecedent of (CP) will destroy Vogel's argument for (*). The thought here is that weakening (CP) will enjoin an analogous weakening of (*). But Vogel's central argument depends on something at least as strong as (*).
Another problem with Vogel's appeal to knowledge closure is that the principle he is defending--viz., (*) Bp fi B~(Bp & ~p)--is not a consequence even of the strongest closure principle for knowledge--, viz., (CP) (Kp & pfiq) fi Kq. It is at best a consequence of some closure principle for belief. Perhaps Vogel's strategy is this. If knowledge closure is valid, then the corresponding closure principle for belief is also valid. In other words, If (Kp & p fi q) fi Kp is valid, then so is (Bp & p fi q) fi Bq. The reasoning here must be that if closure holds for knowledge, then it holds for every necessary condition on knowledge.
The important objection to this strategy is that it is simply false that closure holds of knowledge only if it holds of every necessary condition on knowledge. To think otherwise is to commit the fallacy of composition. 6 So I find no plausible argument in Vogel from the validity of closure for knowledge to the validity of (*).
If we hope to avoid closure principles altogether, then we might rehabilitate Vogel's criticism another way. All we need to do is to argue that
is not satisfied in all those cases where, plausibly, one knows that one is not mistaken in believing p. But consider a case where s knows p and corroborates her belief with an independent source, thereby coming to believe that she is not mistaken. It might be argued that in the closest worlds where s is mistaken (i.e., where sBp & ~p), s continues to believe that she is not mistaken. The idea here is that in the closest worlds where she is mistaken, she continues to believe that she is not mistaken, even though in the actual world she checked her work by an independent method. 7 There is an obvious objection to this outcome. For the case at hand, it is unclear that a world where {s is mistaken but believes she is not} is closer than a world where {s is mistaken but withholds judgement about whether she is mistaken}. After all, in the actual world s doublechecked (by an independent method) whether p. The result of her double-checking was that p.
She thereby concluded that she was not mistaken in believing p. Arguably, the closest worlds where she is mistaken, her double-checking would not have corroborated her belief that p, and so, she loses her reason for thinking she is not mistaken. To deny this is to suggest the following strange claim: a world where independent methods give us faulty results if any of our methods give us faulty results is a closer world than one where our independent methods do not go haywire in this way. My point here is that it is all but clear that (T*) is unsatisfiable or that some general argument avoiding closure principles will show that (T*) is unsatisfiable.
If Vogel can show in some other way that the closest worlds where s is mistaken in believing p are worlds where one would believe that one is not mistaken, then perhaps his argument may be revived. But this is yet to be done, and as we will presently see it would not help. The reason it would not help is that '~(Bp & ~p)' is not the best formal representation of the thought that I do not believe falsely that p.
I Do Not Believe Falsely that p
We are considering the statement, "I do not falsely believe p". One might be inclined to think that this is the negation of "My belief that p is false," in which case, with Vogel, we simply negate the claim "I believe that p and p is false", giving us [(EC)] ~(Bp & ~p). Whether a belief of this form tracks is actually not important, because the thought process behind this regimentation is subtly confused. The relevant formulation of "I do not falsely believe p" is not the negation of "My belief that p is false." These two statements are contraries, not contradictories. The point is developed here.
We begin by noticing that "I do not falsely believe p" (or "I am not mistaken in believing p") is ambiguous. On one reading, the claim that (+) I do not falsely believe p is equivalent to (1) I believe p and p is not false. This reading has the trivial implication that I believe p. The second reading does not have this implication. Accordingly, it may reasonably be argued that I do not falsely believe p, if I do not believe p at all. On this reading, the claim that (+) I do not falsely believe that p is equivalent to (2) it is not the case that both I believe that p and not-p.
Formally,~( Bp & ~p).
Reading 2 does not have the implication that I believe that p. My failing to believe p is sufficient for the truth of 2.
The question is this. In the contexts in which, intuitively, I can know that I do not believe falsely that p, which reading best captures the proposition? In ordinary speech the reasonable claim that I do not believe falsely that p is an expression of epistemic confidence in one's belief that p. And it is this expression of confidence that Vogel is focusing on. For it is in the context of knowing p that it seems to him that one also knows that one is not mistaken in believing p. Omar has a new pair of shoes is true, or at least not false. (2000, (609) (610) My belief that p is not false occurs in a context where I believe p. And it is the belief that p that the thought "My belief that p is not false" is about. So arguably, "My belief that p is not false" is best represented by an expression that entails that I believe p. What is important here is that Sosa is considering contexts in which p is known, and so believed.
The claim that I am not wrong in thinking p must then be saying something that may serve as an expression of epistemic confidence. And so, the claim that I am not mistaken is saying, among other things, that I believe p. If I am saying something that does not imply that I believe p, then I am not saying something that expresses my epistemic confidence in my belief that p. The reading that seems most appropriate then is reading 1, Bp & p. Reading 1 has the truth conditions that best suit it for ordinary speech, where one's claim that one is not mistaken is commonly used as an expression of epistemic confidence. At the very least reading 1 has the truth conditions that best suit it for the kind of case Sosa has in mind--viz., one in which a minimally rational and attentive agent believes both p and that her belief that p has not gone wrong.
Why then do Vogel and Sosa automatically interpret the claim that I am not mistaken with reading 2? I fear that they are confusing the claim that I am not mistaken with the negation of the claim that I am mistaken. But just as the claim that I am not mistaken in believing p ordinarily means something that implies that I do believe that p, so the statement that I am mistaken in believing p implies that I do believe p. And so, if I fail to believe p, then both claims are false. The two claims do not contradict, since the falsity of one does not preclude the falsity of the other. They are contraries, since (in addition to the joint satisfiability of their negations) they cannot both be true. The fact that they cannot both be true explains the confusion; it explains why Vogel and Sosa confuse "I do not believe falsely that p" for the negation of "I do believe falsely that p".
We may better represent the expression of confidence in one's belief as the claim that my belief is correct. This suggests that we regiment the thought as Reading (1) With all due respect, this is a terrible reason to opt for one reading over another. The correct logical characterization of a proposition (that is not a counterfactual) should be decided independently of any problems there may be with interpreting counterfactuals that embed that
proposition. Otherwise, we should not interpret any apparent natural language conjunction as p & q, when evaluating a counterfactual that embeds its negation (in the antecedent place).
Back to Tracking
We seek to determine whether the belief that I am correct in believing p (i.e., Bp & p) can track the truth. The belief can track just in case the following counterfactual can be true:
This is the relevant instance of (T). Equivalently,
(T**) embeds the dreaded disjunctive antecedent that Vogel wished to avoid. But for the standard case a counterfactual with a disjunctive antecedent simplifies. That is, a counterfactual with a disjunctive antecedent, (p v q) oAE r, implies the conjunction of two counterfactuals, (p oAE r) & (q oAE r ). For instance, "if it were to rain or frost, the game would be canceled" implies, "If it were to rain the game would be cancelled, and if it were to frost the came would be cancelled". Of course there are cases that appear to invalidate the inference, but all of these are cases where one of the disjuncts is not taken to be a 'real possibility', 9 as in "If Spain were to fight on one side or the other [i.e., with the Allies or with the Axis in WWII], she would fight with the Axis" or in "If she were to run for Congress [i.e., the House or the Senate], she would run for the House." There is no reason to think that (T**) exhibits the peculiarity of these latter examples. So we should allow the inference here. would not have thought that my belief that p is true, not false. (T**1) is satisfied. The two counterfactuals, (T**1) and (T**2), are jointly satisfiable. 12 So, tracking condition (T) is satisfied in the relevant cases.
In conclusion, Vogel's proposal against truth-tracking rests on a subtle confusion about how to interpret an expression of epistemic confidence. The best interpretation allows for the possibility of sensitively believing that one is not mistaken. If Vogel's argument was intended to show that any renewed interest in tracking conditions is hopeless, then Vogel's argument falls short. If Sosa's criticism was intended to motivate his own counterfactual analysis, then Sosa's analysis is ill-motivated. Whatever the shortcomings of truth-tracking proposals, they do not include the impossibility of reflective knowledge that one is not mistaken.
